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RACE AND GENDER IN THE LAW REVIEW
Cynthia Grant Bowman,* Dorothy Roberts** & Leonard S. Rubinowitz***
A number of years ago a noted historian of the American West,
Patricia Limerick, addressed the plenary session of the Association of
American Law Schools.1 In her speech, she described how the received history of the West consisted of a narrative in which explorers like Lewis and
Clark entered and discovered a vast empty territory. This account was, of
course, inaccurate; as Limerick pointed out, the West was populated before
the explorers arrived, just not with folks like them. And, she noted, how
much more interesting the story has become since we can now see that
empty land as populated with diverse peoples.
As important, the traditional narrative obscured the bloody reality of
extermination, enslavement, and domination by white settlers that placed
them in a position to construct an official history.2 It deleted as well the resistance of the peoples the settlers tried to subjugate. The story has become
both less noble and more complicated once contested by the perspectives of
people of color.
Law review literature followed a similar pattern. When you glance
back one hundred years, as we have done in preparing for this symposium,
the contents of Northwestern’s law review reflect a territory inhabited only
by white males and their legal problems. Gradually, however, the other
populations that have been there all along appear in its pages—African
Americans first, then women, then people of color in whom a variety of
characteristics intersect, and finally persons of differing sexual orientations.
Their appearance initially was provoked by changes in the legal environment, such as the decision in Brown v. Board of Education and the passage
*

Professor of Law and of Gender Studies, Northwestern University School of Law. Professor Bowman would like to thank Judge Elaine Bucklo and Professor Herma Hill Kay for their information about
the “old days,” and Rachel Julis and Laura Straus for their assistance with research.
**
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1
Patricia Nelson Limerick, Address at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting
(Jan. 8, 1993).
2
See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European
Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237
(1989).

27

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

of the Civil Rights Acts; but once they had been acknowledged as appropriate subjects for legal research, a flowering of theory and analysis ensued.
This Essay tells the story of the discovery of race and gender in the
pages of the Northwestern University Law Review (“the Law Review”). It is
not a story of theory leading practice. Indeed, the work of activists pursuing social change was the initial impulse for the development of theoretical
work on these issues. Now, however, both race and gender are recognized
as important themes in the law. The addition of these topics has profoundly
affected and improved legal theory, which is today far more complex and
nuanced than the men who originally established the Law Review would
have dreamed.
Because of the critical, and continuing, link between real-world activism on issues of race and gender and academic writing about those issues,
our discussion will be set in the historical context that led to the development of theory and, in turn, was influenced by it. We begin by discussing,
in Part I, the injection of issues of race into the Law Review, against the
background of the struggle for civil rights in the United States. Part II then
traces the introduction of discussions of gender and sexual orientation. Part
III describes the development of critical race theory and critical race feminism, highlighting their virtual absence from these pages. Critical race
theorists contested liberal notions of racial progress that dominated civil
rights discourse as well as mainstream feminists’ failure to see the intersection of racism and sexism in structures of power. Although the Law Review
discovered the existence of diverse peoples and included articles about
them, it has for the most part failed to include their uniquely critical perspective, reflected in critical race theory. This scholarly lacuna highlights
the importance of going beyond the analysis of discrimination using traditional legal tools to challenge the central role legal reasoning and institutions have played in perpetuating inequality.
I.

RACE

A. The First Half-Century
When the first volume (1906–1907) of what was then called the Illinois
Law Review included an article on slavery, that did not signal the beginning
of a trend.3 In the next half-century, the Law Review paid little attention to
racial questions. When it did so, the arguments and analyses often reflected
3

The article discussed Abraham Lincoln’s representation of a Kentucky slave owner who had
brought a slave family to Illinois, a free state, in 1845 and then sought to take the family back to Kentucky as slaves, in 1847. The author sought to defend Lincoln’s defense of the slave owner by suggesting that Lincoln argued for his client only on procedural grounds, and, when asked by the judge for his
substantive view, Lincoln replied that the family should be declared to be free because their owner had
brought them to Illinois. Duncan T. McIntyre, Lincoln and the Matson Slave Case, 1 ILL. L. REV. 386
(1907).
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the law and ideology of the time, and therefore were as likely to seem egregiously racist to modern sensibilities as to reflect more enlightened views
on race.
When the Illinois Law Review began publishing a decade after Plessy
v. Ferguson,4 it joined the national chorus of silence about that decision.5
While the journal’s lack of attention to Plessy may have stemmed in part
from its early emphasis on Illinois state law issues, the gap also reflected
the fact that the case received little public or scholarly attention for many
years after the Supreme Court spoke. The decision that came to be seen as
a key symbol of our national shame of racial subordination passed largely
unnoticed at the time—a sign of the deeply embedded nature of the racism
it reflected.
In fact, the main mention of Plessy in the early decades of the Illinois
Law Review came in a 1926 article by Northwestern Professor Andrew A.
Bruce, discussing racial zoning by private contract.6 Bruce cited Plessy as
part of the legal context of segregation within which he considered restraints on alienation and restraints on use. He argued against restraints on
alienation and in favor of the permissibility of restraints on use—including
the exclusion of Blacks from living in white neighborhoods—using Plessy
to provide support for his argument.7
Consistent with much of the thought and rhetoric of the time, the author suggested that the consequence of Blacks moving into white neighborhoods was
usually, and almost inevitably, not merely a lessening of property values but a
constant irritation and ultimate moving out of the original inhabitants who are
unwilling to have colored neighbors and above all to send their children to the
neighborhood district public schools where the children of all classes and nationalities mingle and congregate.8

4

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
There was little comment about Plessy by scholars and others until the 1940s. Cheryl I. Harris,
The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson:
The Death and Resurrection of Racial Formalism, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 181, 216 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
6
Andrew A. Bruce, Racial Zoning by Private Contract in the Light of the Constitutions and the
Rule Against Restraints on Alienation, 21 ILL. L. REV. 704 (1927).
7
Id. at 711. “Black” is capitalized whenever it refers to Black people, in order to indicate that
Blacks, or African Americans, are a specific cultural group with its own history, traditions, experience,
and identity—not just people of a particular color. Using the uppercase letter signifies recognition of the
culture, as it does with Latinos, Asian Americans, or Native Americans. See MARTHA BIONDI, TO
STAND AND FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY (2003); Kimberlé
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).
8
Bruce, supra note 6, at 704.
5
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He argued that private agreements to restrict use on a racial basis would aid
free alienation because “the fear of a negro invasion materially interferes
with the profitable sale of almost every homesite.”9
Even earlier, in its Editorial Notes, the Law Review reported favorably
on the resolution of a question of racial exclusion that was before the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) in 1912.10 The Executive Committee
had elected three Black members without knowledge of their race. When
their race became apparent, southern members protested and the Executive
Committee sought to revoke the Blacks’ membership. The Law Review
commented favorably on the ABA’s racially tainted resolution of this controversy:
That as it has never been contemplated that members of the colored race
should become members of this Association, the several local councils are directed, if at any time any of them shall recommend a person of the colored race
for membership, to accompany the recommendation with a statement of the
fact that he is of such race.11

The Law Review concluded that it was quite proper that racial information
be provided so that future elections could proceed with full knowledge of
the relevant facts.12 The editorial also applauded the “fine spirit” of the
Black member who resigned because he had been elected without the members having knowledge of all the relevant facts.13 In taking this position, the
Law Review reflected the racial norms of the times and aligned itself with
the dominant view within the legal establishment.14
While racial discrimination was at times condoned in the pages of the
Law Review, on other occasions race remained invisible in discussions of
topics where a substantial discussion of race might have been expected. A
1918 article, Justice Holmes and the Fourteenth Amendment, paid only
brief attention to racial discrimination and did not mention Plessy.15 Almost
two decades later, in a tribute to Justice Roger Brooke Taney, Dean
Acheson did not discuss Dred Scott, the Justice’s best known and most notorious opinion.16 Instead, Acheson referred to that decision only by implication, in the first paragraph of the article, as an unfortunate departure from
9

Id. at 716. Bruce analogized restrictions on Black entry to the prohibition of the sale or use of liquor in an area, since both have “a marked and beneficial tendency to attract purchasers to a residential
district.” Id.
10
The American Bar Association Meeting, 7 ILL. L. REV. 177, 179 (1912).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
It was not until 1943 that the ABA resolved that “membership in the American Bar Association is
not dependent upon race, creed, or color.” 68 A.B.A. REP. 109–10, 168 (1943).
15
Fletcher Dobyns, Justice Holmes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 ILL. L. REV. 71 (1918).
16
Dean G. Acheson, Roger Brooke Taney: Notes upon Judicial Self Restraint, 31 ILL. L. REV. 705
(1937).
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his otherwise exemplary record of judicial self-restraint—the focus of the
article.17 Even an article on President Truman’s civil rights program said
little about race.18
In contrast, several student comments in the Law Review’s first halfcentury reflected a more enlightened view on racial matters. As early as
1913–1914, a commentator criticized an Illinois Supreme Court decision
permitting a cemetery to discriminate based on race.19 Similarly, a student
case note a decade later criticized a California court’s decision holding
valid a racially restrictive covenant.20 The note argued that the covenant
was an impermissible restraint on alienation. Moreover, in the 1930s, two
students criticized the United States Supreme Court for leaving claims of
racial discrimination in jury selection to the state courts of the South to resolve.21
For much of its first half-century, the Northwestern University Law
Review had “Illinois” in its title and focused substantially on legal developments in the state. Yet it paid relatively little attention to the racial questions that emerged in the state, such as pervasive housing discrimination.
Challenges to various aspects of racial exclusion from neighborhoods and
communities resulted in significant decisions in state and federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court’s restrictive covenant case, Hansberry v. Lee.22 Like most law schools’ scholarly journals of the time,
Northwestern’s law review did not publish any articles about these developments.
The Law Review’s first half-century of publication also failed to address important racial questions that arose in the federal courts, the Con17

By way of an apparent apology for Taney, Acheson suggested that
[i]t is the irony of fate that for three-quarters of a century the accepted conception of Roger Brooke
Taney has been based upon the occasion when, yielding to the temptation, always disastrous, to
save the country, he put aside the judicial self-restraint which was his great contribution to the law
and custom of the Constitution.
Id. at 705.
18
Charles Wallace Collins, Constitutional Aspects of the Truman Civil Rights Program, 44 ILL. L.
REV. 1 (1949). It focused instead on arguing that Truman’s proposals to have the federal government
protect individuals’ rights—whatever those rights might be and whoever might be protected—
constituted an unconstitutional intrusion into states’ rights.
19
Alfred W. Bays, Cemeteries—Discrimination Against Negroes, 8 ILL. L. REV. 208 (1913). The
comment included a reasoned argument challenging the Court’s analysis, as well as an eloquent statement about the injustice of this form of discrimination.
20
Recent Case, Conveyances—Restraints Against Alienation to Negroes, 20 ILL. L. REV. 723
(1925).
21
Alfred J. Cilella & Irwin J. Kaplan, Comment, Discrimination Against Negroes in Jury Service,
29 ILL. L. REV. 498 (1934). The authors characterized the Supreme Court as having “washed its hands
of the whole question and transferred its duty of enforcement to the state authorities, who in the light of
racial antagonism in the South cannot be expected to be overzealous in the enforcement of the negroes’
right to serve on juries.” Id. at 504. They recognized that, “[i]n all fairness, it should be pointed out that
negro discrimination is not peculiarly a southern problem.” Id. at 499 n.3.
22
311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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gress, and the executive branch. For several decades, the NAACP and subsequently the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”) engaged in a litigation
campaign focused on school segregation that resulted in a number of significant decisions by the Supreme Court.23 A series of successful challenges
to racial exclusion by state law schools and segregation within a state
graduate school24 laid the groundwork for civil rights lawyers to embark on
a frontal assault on state-imposed segregation in public schools.25 In the
same period, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases involving exclusion of Blacks from the electoral process—the so-called Texas white primary cases;26 a case holding unconstitutional the judicial enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants;27 and challenges to racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system.28
The World War II Japanese internment cases represent still another
important missed opportunity.29 In particular, Korematsu v. United States,
which both established the “strict scrutiny” test in racial discrimination
cases and found that the federal government passed this test in interning
120,000 Japanese Americans, received no attention in the Law Review at
the time.
In addition to largely ignoring significant judicial activity, the Law Review during its first half-century paid little attention to the role of Congress
and the executive branch in struggles for racial equality. While Congress
did not enact any civil rights legislation between 1875 and 1957, civil rights
activists—especially the NAACP—pressed that body to address racial discrimination.30 Much of the lobbying was part of a long, unsuccessful effort
to secure federal antilynching legislation, in order to combat the lynchings
23

The first case was filed in state court in Maryland on behalf of a Black applicant who was denied
admission to the University of Maryland Law School because of his race. The Maryland Supreme Court
ordered his admission to the law school. Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 594 (Md. 1936); see also
MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARHSALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,
1936–1961, at 11, 14–15 (1994). See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
24
See McLauren v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337
(1938).
25
In a post-Brown article in the Law Review, Loyola of New Orleans Law School Dean A.E. Papale
referred to this process as the “chipping away” at Plessy. A.E. Papale, Judicial Enforcement of Desegregation: Its Problems and Limitations, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 301, 306–08 (1957).
26
See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Grovey v.
Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). In 1959, a student piece in the
Law Review discussed these cases as part of a student civil rights symposium. Elections and Voting
Rights, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 367 (1959).
27
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
28
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Moore v. Dempsey, 209 U.S. 86 (1923).
29
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943).
30
DENTON L. WATSON, LION IN THE LOBBY: CLARENCE MITCHELL, JR.’S STRUGGLE FOR THE
PASSAGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS (2002).
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of thousands of Blacks in the South in the first half of the century—with
virtually no prosecution of the perpetrators in state courts.31
While the executive branch took initiatives to address racial discrimination only sporadically, these efforts also merited comment and analysis
by law reviews. Threatened with a massive march on Washington during
World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order
banning racial discrimination by federal defense contractors—thus increasing opportunities for employment of Blacks in those industries.32 Later,
President Truman ordered the racial integration of the armed forces, another
significant step on the racial front.33 None of this activity was discussed in
the Law Review.
Moreover, if Blacks were barely present in the Law Review’s landscape
during its first fifty years, other people of color—Asian Americans, Latinos,
and Native Americans—were absent entirely. Of course, the Law Review
had a great deal of company in this regard, in both the scholarly world and
the dominant culture.
The first issue of Volume 51 of the Law Review (March–April, 1956)
began with a congratulatory statement on the Review’s 50th anniversary by
Chief Justice Earl Warren.34 The Chief Justice took note of the importance
of law reviews to the judiciary in influencing judicial thought. He praised
the Northwestern University Law Review for its “spirit of critical examination and inquiry, of careful scholarship and devotion to the law . . . .”35 If
the Chief Justice had wanted to identify specific topics that the Review had
examined carefully over the previous half-century, the burning issues of
race would not have merited a place on that list.
B. The Second Half-Century
The Law Review’s 50th anniversary issue also featured comments by
Kenneth F. Burgess, President of Northwestern’s Board of Trustees, on the
role of the law review.36 He suggested “that the law review renders its
greatest contribution when its editors select for discussion those legal issues
which have the greatest general interest . . . .”37 His first example of a subject with “national interest” was the segregation cases.38 Whether his ad31

The United States Senate recently issued an apology for failing to pass antilynching legislation.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Senate Apologizes, Mostly, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, § 4, at 43.
32
Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 25, 1941). Roosevelt also established a Fair Employment Practices Committee (“FEPC”) to monitor implementation of the executive order.
33
Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948).
34
Earl Warren, Preface, The Northwestern University Law Review Begins Its Fifty-First Year of
Publication, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1956).
35
Id.
36
Kenneth F. Burgess, Law Reviews and the Practicing Lawyer, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 10 (1956).
37
Id. at 11.
38
Id.

33

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

monition is to be taken as prescription or prophecy, shortly after the celebration of its first half-century of publication, discussions of race began to
appear on the pages of the Law Review in a much more significant way.
The Northwestern University Law Review began its second halfcentury at a time of great civil rights ferment, in the courts, in the streets,
and to a lesser extent, in Congress. Not surprisingly, in light of the prominence of Brown v. Board of Education, educational inequality received the
most attention in the Law Review; but other race matters were also examined in scholars’ articles and student comments—including race consciousness, housing, economic opportunity, and public accommodations.
In 1959, early in the Law Review’s second half-century, the student
editors organized a symposium on civil rights law that seemed to suggest
that they understood the interrelated nature of the aspects of the system of
racial subordination. The symposium consisted of student comments on a
broad range of civil rights issues, including federal civil rights legislation,39
school desegregation,40 voting rights,41 federally guaranteed civil rights
(public facilities, housing, and transportation),42 and freedom of association
for civil rights organizations.43 In the introduction to the symposium, the
editors acknowledged the courts’ critical and difficult role in addressing the
problem of “racial supremacy,” as well as the initial stirrings in Congress to
address civil rights issues for the first time in three-quarters of a century.
The symposium set the stage for the significantly increased attention the
Law Review would pay to racial questions over the following decades.44

39

Federal Civil Rights Legislation, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 332 (1959).
Racial Desegregation of Public Schools: Application of the Principles of Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
54 NW. U. L. REV. 348 (1959); State Efforts to Circumvent Desegregation: Private Schools, Pupil
Placement, and Geographic Segregation, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 354 (1959).
41
Elections and Voting Rights, supra note 26.
42
Publicly-Owned Facilities, Housing, and Transportation: Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights, 54
NW. U. L. REV. 377 (1959).
43
Group Action: Civil Rights and Freedom of Association, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 390 (1959).
44
Within a few years of the symposium, Northwestern University School of Law offered its first
civil rights course taught by Professor Dawn Clark Netsch, who started the race relations course shortly
after joining her alma mater’s faculty in 1965. The class focused on the Supreme Court’s historical role,
including the infamous Dred Scott decision, Brown and the developing Fourteenth Amendment case
law, and then-current local civil rights issues, such as the exploitation of Black home buyers in Chicago
that led to the Contract Buyers League litigation. Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp.
210 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
The first civil rights course in the country is said to have been taught by James Nabrit, Jr. at Howard
University. Nabrit had been the only African American in the Northwestern University Law School
Class of 1927, an Honor Student and the first Black at the school to be elected to the Order of the Coif.
J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844–1944, at 349 (1993).
Nabrit went on to become dean of Howard Law School, President of Howard University, and a key participant in the civil rights litigation of the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Telephone Interview by Professor Leonard Rubinowitz with Seth Kronemer, Archivist, Howard Law School (Jan. 11,
2005). However, it was decades before Civil Rights became a staple of the law schools’ curriculum.
40

34

100:27 (2006)

Race and Gender in the Law Review

1. Education.—Brown triggered as many questions as it answered.
Those questions occupied the pages of the Law Review in a sustained way
over the half-century following the decision.45 The Law Review’s scholarship about race and education exhibited several patterns: (1) it addressed a
wide variety of the critical theoretical and practical questions that arose in
the fifty years after Brown; (2) it made extensive use of empirical data—
both quantitative and qualitative—to test the propositions advanced; and (3)
it often challenged the conventional wisdom of the time. The Law Review
thus made a substantial contribution to our knowledge about legal remedies
for racial inequality in education.
The post-Brown issues included, inter alia, remedy, implementation,
violations in the North, and equalization across school districts. Each received attention in the Law Review. In Brown II, the Supreme Court issued
a vague desegregation mandate and assigned the responsibility to district
courts to determine what constituted an acceptable desegregation plan.46
The Court largely left matters in the hands of the district judges until the
late 1960s and early 1970s, when it began to spell out the reach and limitations of district courts’ remedial powers.47 In the next few years, the Law
Review published two articles on school desegregation remedies. Leonard
Strickman argued for a definition of the violation in school desegregation
cases that permitted certain kinds of interdistrict remedies, notwithstanding
the constraints the Court had imposed on this kind of relief in the Milliken
case.48 Stephen Kanner sought to explain and rationalize the Court’s “controlling principle” concerning the relationship between the violation and the
remedy in school desegregation and other equal protection cases.49
Moreover, major casebooks on the law of race did not generally appear until the 1970s. The first
edition of Derrick Bell’s Race, Racism, and American Law in 1973 quickly became the standard text in
civil rights courses and was used by Professor Rubinowitz for several years after he succeeded Professors Netsch and Thomas Todd in teaching the course in 1975.
45
The Law Review did not join the scholarly debates that took place in the aftermath of Brown
about the correctness and the persuasiveness of the decision. See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination
and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959). However, in a
1979 Law Review article, Raoul Berger reiterated his argument that the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrated that the framers did not intend to prohibit school segregation. Raoul
Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 311, 326–31 (1979).
The debate about the opinion itself continued with the publication in 2001 of a book in which a number
of leading scholars wrote hypothetical opinions in the case. WHAT “BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION”
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL
RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
46
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
47
See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
48
Leonard P. Strickman, School Desegregation at the Crossroads, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 725 (1975).
49
Stephen Barrett Kanner, From Denver to Dayton: The Development of a Theory of Equal Protection Remedies, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 382 (1977).
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Whatever school desegregation remedies courts adopted, implementation constituted a major challenge.50 Several articles in the Law Review addressed this issue—two focusing on the very early stages of implementation
and a third addressing questions related to the termination of decrees decades after Brown. In 1957, Dean A.E. Papale of Loyola Law School of
New Orleans took note of the opposition that had already arisen to desegregation and made a plea to southern political leaders to be realistic about the
future and proceed with peaceful integration pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s mandate.51 Decades later, Davison M. Douglas analyzed the early
desegregation experience in North Carolina, a state that had not pursued a
strategy of complete resistance to the Supreme Court’s decision. Douglas
argued that the moderate rhetoric employed by North Carolina officials enabled the state to minimize both actual integration and the economic costs
incurred by states that acted in open defiance of the Court’s mandate.52
In a 2000 article, Wendy Parker examined the extent to which school
desegregation cases were ending, which might have sounded the death knell
for this litigation.53 She found that in spite of several Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s that discussed the prerequisites for terminating desegregation litigation, there was little movement by defendants to end their
cases.54 Parker concluded that court-ordered desegregation was alive, but
not well, since many cases were languishing and in need of more active judicial involvement to achieve their original purposes.
With remedies adopted and implementation stagnating in the South in
the 1950s and early 1960s, civil rights lawyers and the courts also turned
their attention to school segregation in the North. Brown applied directly
only to states where state statutes or constitutional provisions required or
permitted public school segregation.55 No such formal rules governed
school attendance in the North, yet many school systems experienced a high
degree of racial segregation at mid-century.
It was not until its 1973 decision in Keyes that the Supreme Court
found that de jure segregation could exist as a result of school board policies and practices.56 However, a decade earlier, the Law Review published a
50

GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
72–93 (1991).
51
Papale, supra note 25, at 318. The article was based on a Rosenthal lecture that Dean Papale presented at the Law School in the 1956–57 academic year. This is an annual lecture series at Northwestern, funded by the Julius Rosenthal Foundation. Publication of the lectures has contributed to legal
scholarship for more than seventy years.
52
Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South During the Decade
After Brown, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 92 (1994).
53
Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157 (2000).
54
Id. at 1162–78 (discussing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991)).
55
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954).
56
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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series of three articles by John Kaplan examining school desegregation litigation in the North.57 Two of the articles focused on specific cases—from
Gary, Indiana and New Rochelle, New York, an integrated community outside New York City. The third article focused on the northern problem
more generally. In these articles, Kaplan probed the facts of northern
school segregation and suggested the kind of complicated legal analysis that
was necessary to make constitutional determinations in these cases.58
Along with pursuing desegregation, activists interested in educational
opportunity turned to litigation seeking to achieve “equalization” across
school districts. Although these cases focused most directly on wealth inequality, they had important racial implications. After the Supreme Court
found no constitutional violation in the existence of vast disparities in resources among a state’s school districts in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez59 in 1973, proponents of school finance equalization
turned to state courts and legislatures to achieve their goals. In a 1976 article in the Law Review, Edward A. Zelinsky argued that proponents’ state
school aid formulas for reducing disparities would be counterproductive because they favored middle-class suburbs over central cities.60 He urged revising the formulas to emphasize poverty, in order to ensure that funds
would be distributed to more urbanized communities.
Twenty-five years later, Denise Morgan took a different tack on the
school finance litigation. She argued that disparities in school funding constituted a form of systemic racial discrimination because disparities in resources caused racial disparities in educational outcomes.61 Remedies under
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act therefore should include educational
initiatives that research has shown to have a positive impact on student
achievement, such as smaller class size and smaller schools.62
The Law Review’s scholarship related to race and education was
marked by a heavy emphasis on both quantitative and qualitative empirical
research. Zelinsky’s article on educational equalization applied a variety of
state aid formulas to Connecticut school districts in order to reach the conclusion that the school districts with the largest population of poor and mi57

John Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools—Part I: The New Rochelle Experience, 58
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nority people—Bridgeport, Hartford, and New Haven—would be “losers”
under each of those formulas.63 Parker carried out a very substantial quantitative analysis of school desegregation cases to determine the status of those
cases and the extent to which efforts had been made to terminate them or to
move them toward the relief to which plaintiffs were entitled.64
On the qualitative side, Kaplan undertook significant research on the
communities and the school districts in Gary and New Rochelle as part of
his exploration of the desegregation litigation in those communities.65 Similarly, Douglas examined the desegregation experience of North Carolina in
depth to analyze the impact of the use of moderate rhetoric in response to
Brown.66
Finally, several of the education articles challenged the conventional
wisdom of the time. While most research on “massive resistance” made no
distinctions among southern states’ strategies, Douglas argued that there
were significant differences among the states in their responses, and that
those differences had important outcomes for the states involved.67 Zelinsky’s analysis of the impact of state aid formulas directly confronted the
widely shared view among equalization proponents that their formulas
would accomplish their purpose.68 Moreover, Parker’s analysis of the status
of desegregation cases put the lie to the consensus that the Supreme Court’s
termination decisions made desegregation remedies a thing of the past.
2. Race Consciousness.—The Supreme Court first addressed the legality of state-sponsored affirmative action in the Bakke case in 1978, upholding a challenge to the University of California at Davis Medical
School’s use of racial/ethnic quotas in its admissions process.69 More than a
decade earlier, well before the term “affirmative action” came into vogue,
the Northwestern University Law Review published an article by Kaplan
that anticipated much of the debate that has garnered so much attention
since that time.70 His 1966 article, Equal Justice in an Unequal World:
Equality for the Negro—The Problem of Special Treatment, was one of the
first in-depth examinations of this complex and controversial subject.71
Kaplan discussed many of the theoretical and practical arguments in sup-
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port of, and in opposition to, the use of racial preferences in three important
areas of social life—employment, housing, and education.
The debate about race consciousness surfaced periodically in the Law
Review. In a 2004 symposium on the Rehnquist Court, Nelson Lund72
strongly criticized the Court’s continued approval of race-conscious admissions in higher education in the 2003 Grutter decision.73 Lund suggested
that the precedent to which Grutter bore “the greatest formal resemblance”
was Plessy, because both decisions deferred to what the Justices deemed to
be “reasonable” measures to achieve goals that proponents viewed as important to society.74
In contrast, Christopher Bracey’s review essay of economist Glen
Loury’s book, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality, took as its starting point
that color blindness did not characterize the American past or present.75
Bracey ended by supporting Loury’s call for race-conscious measures to
address the pervasive racial disparities resulting in part from deeply embedded racial stereotyping.76
3. Housing.—While housing discrimination is closely related to the
problem of educational inequality, housing received far less attention in the
Law Review in its second half-century. During that time, the Law Review’s
entire body of work on housing consisted of an article by Professor Leonard
Rubinowitz, one of the authors of this piece, and Elizabeth Trosman, and
three substantial student comments.77 Each of these papers owes a debt to
Kaplan’s early article on race consciousness, since they propose raceconscious measures to achieve goals of expanding “choice” for Blacks in
seeking housing or achieving residential racial integration. Each argues for
race consciousness as a way of remedying the effects of racially discrimina72
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tory policies and practices—public, private, or both—that have long characterized metropolitan housing markets.
The Rubinowitz and Trosman article analyzed the provision in the
1968 federal Fair Housing Act that requires the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development to administer its programs affirmatively to further fair housing.78 The authors argued that this mandate requires race-conscious efforts to provide home ownership opportunities for
Black home seekers on a broader geographical basis than had been available in the past.79 Richard Sander’s comment emphasized racial integration
rather than expanded options for Blacks as the goal of housing reform and
proposed several race-conscious measures designed to produce stable integration.80 He suggested that, in addition to the conventional explanations
focusing on racial discrimination and income disparities, there is a dynamic
process that perpetuates segregation.
The other two student comments examined remedial aspects at different points in the life of Chicago’s forty-year-old landmark public housing
desegregation case—the Gautreaux case.81 While this case has been the
subject of voluminous literature, these comments examined aspects of the
case that had not been fully explored previously.82 Each proposed raceconscious remedies that seemed both principled and pragmatic to the respective authors in light of the circumstances at the time they were writing.
In 1994, David Blair-Loy argued that it would be unconstitutional to rehabilitate the existing segregated public housing without having in place other
initiatives to provide public housing residents with opportunities to move
into predominantly white areas.83 By 2000, much of Chicago’s public housing had been demolished, and much of his argument had become moot. In
revisiting the remedial possibilities at that point, Joseph Seliga argued that
both redevelopment of public housing sites and mobility initiatives should
be employed to produce racial integration and avoid creating another
ghetto.84
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4. Economic Opportunity.—The Civil Rights Movement of midcentury and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 addressed racial discrimination in
employment in all kinds and levels of jobs. Once again, the focus was
largely on the South although employment discrimination was widespread
throughout the country. With time, a broader understanding of economic
opportunity and wealth disparities broadened the agenda to include entrepreneurial opportunities and access to other forms of wealth, including
home ownership.
A few articles in the Law Review addressed important but isolated aspects of economic inequality. In 2001, Thomas Mitchell pushed the scholarly envelope by examining a problem facing southern Blacks that had
received little attention in the law reviews—the dispossession of land from
African-American families. While the United States had never made good
on its Reconstruction-era promise of “forty acres and a mule” for former
slaves, many Blacks had managed to acquire farm land in the rural South in
the late nineteenth century. Mitchell demonstrated in great detail the complex of legal and practical forces that had caused an involuntary loss of
much of this land, focusing primarily on partition sales of Black-owned
land held under tenancies in common. He also proposed innovative legal
reforms and practical steps that could reduce future losses of this important
economic resource.85
Other Law Review articles looked at more conventional aspects of
Blacks’ economic opportunities, such as the courts’ reluctance to address
the present effects of past employment discrimination in the early days of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,86 the applicability of the National
Labor Relations Act to racial discrimination by both unions and employers,87 and the application of Title VII to upper-level jobs.88 This scholarship
confronted some of the important basic questions in what was then an
emerging field of federal employment discrimination law.
5. Public Accommodations and Transportation.—Civil rights activists—Montgomery citizens boycotting buses, sit-in demonstrators, and
freedom riders—coupled with litigation and civil rights legislation dramatically changed policies and practices of public accommodation and transpor85
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tation, especially in the South. This is a story of the efficacy of both activism and law reform and, sometimes, the synergy between the two. In a context in which so much of the effort to challenge racial subordination has
produced mixed results at best, the campaign to end discrimination in public accommodations and transportation stands out as a success.
However, only one Law Review article addressed racial discrimination
in public accommodations. Rather than focusing on traditional “public accommodations,” such as restaurants, hotels, theaters, or public transportation, this major, book-length article examined a novel arena untouched by
most scholarship. In 1995, Joseph Singer argued, in No Right to Exclude:
Public Accommodations and Private Property, that the law should prohibit,
in a clear way, racial discrimination by retail stores.89 Title II of the 1964
Civil Rights Act regulated so-called public accommodations, like hotels and
restaurants. Moreover, the scope and the reach of the post-Civil War Civil
Rights Acts remained uncertain. Singer argued that the law should be clarified to conform to social expectations that businesses will serve the public
unless they have good reasons not to do so. His persuasive argument was
particularly important and timely in light of the continuing claims of Blacks
that retail stores treat them as security risks by excluding them and by using
unusually aggressive surveillance measures because of their race.
6. Criminal Justice.—The questions related to race and the criminal
justice system changed dramatically during the Law Review’s second halfcentury. In the era of Jim Crow, civil rights advocates challenged the racial
bias that permeated the criminal justice system of the South, from not
prosecuting whites who lynched Blacks or assassinated civil rights leaders
and workers to exclusion of Blacks from juries, which led both to acquittal
of whites in crimes against Blacks and conviction of innocent Blacks.
As some progress was made in addressing these historical problems,
new modes of racial injustice emerged that were national in scope. The last
third of the twentieth century witnessed the mass incarceration of Blacks
and Latinos, the racially disproportionate implementation of the death penalty, dramatic disparities in sentencing along racial lines, and widespread
wrongful convictions in cases involving defendants of color, especially in
capital cases.
The Law Review paid some attention to the earlier set of problems, but
did not address the modern issues related to race and the criminal justice
system. Its consideration of the criminal justice system was limited to two
articles focusing on discrimination in the South in the 1960s and 1970s.
One argued for limits on states’ ability to exclude volunteer out-of-state
lawyers, especially where local lawyers were unwilling to represent Black
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defendants.90 It demonstrated that Black defendants routinely went without
representation in misdemeanor cases. Most white lawyers refused to handle
their cases, and Blacks were extremely underrepresented in the legal profession as a result of discrimination at all levels of the educational system.
The author also showed persuasively how southern states had used their
ability to exclude out-of-state lawyers to ensure the lack of legal representation. Lawyers from the North were poised to go to the South in greater
numbers if these bars could be removed, so the article’s proposal had important potential practical consequences.
The other article entered the ongoing federalism debates by arguing for
federal intervention in the southern courts to protect against discrimination
by the police, prosecutors, and judges. The author proposed providing injunctive remedies for patterns of discrimination, taking the position that
some states’ systems were so tainted that federal judicial intervention was
necessary to ferret out the systematic racism.91 Advocates for “states’
rights” would have found this kind of proposal anathema, since it suggested
substantial federal intervention into the southern states’ court systems.
In sum, starting in mid-century, civil rights activism, litigation, and
legislation all provided a new level of visibility to critical questions of race,
and the Law Review responded to the challenge of examining these crucial
and controversial issues.92 At the same time, there is a degree of continuity
in the scholarship across the two periods. The many difficult questions involving public education received by far the most attention in the Law Review; but other important racial matters were discussed as well. However,
there continued to be significant gaps in the aspects of the system of racial
subordination that received serious attention, such as participation in the political process, economic opportunity, and contemporary inequities in the
criminal justice system. Moreover, in the second half-century, as in the
90
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first, other people of color, such as Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native
Americans, remained virtually invisible in the pages of the Law Review.
II. GENDER AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Prior to the 1970s, anyone perusing law reviews would have thought
that only men had legal issues worthy of discussion. The introduction of
gender and sexual orientation into law review literature began with the entry of women into law schools and the legal profession. Law schools began
to admit women in substantial numbers only after passage of the federal
civil rights laws and under threat of litigation in the late 1960s and early
1970s.93 There were, for example, a total of 46 women and 329 men at
Northwestern University School of Law in 1970.94 The new group of students brought with them concerns about issues that affected their lives, and
legal discussions of those issues began to appear first in student notes and
comments. Women entered legal academia as teachers in some, albeit
small, numbers about a decade later.95 Their presence resulted in a flowering of theoretical writing about women’s issues. These developments, as
they are reflected in the pages of the Law Review, can be divided into the
following historical periods: (1) the 1970s, the era of formal equality thinking about sex equality; (2) the 1980s, when many schools of feminist theory
developed; (3) the 1990s, when feminist legal theory had become well established; and (4) the present.
A. The 1970s: The Era of Formal Equality
The development of legal theory about women is one of the many children of the so-called Second Wave of the women’s movement, sometimes
dated from the publication of Betty Friedan’s book The Feminine Mystique
in 1963.96 Women formed consciousness-raising groups and began to discuss the many issues that affected their lives: rape, child sex abuse, sexual
harassment, domestic violence, illegal abortions, and exclusion from educational and employment possibilities as well as from places of public accommodation—all issues that had essentially been ignored by the law
during the period when it was dominated by men. After private discussions
93
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revealed how common these problems were in the lives of women, activist
women sought law reform. With the passage of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act in 1964, formal equality of women in the workplace became a
possibility at last.
By 1969, the first course on Law and Women was taught, at NYU
School of Law.97 While the first generation of legal activists litigated cases,
they also began to write, and they and their students created much of the
theory which then informed legal practice.98 The activities of these women
during the 1970s, the results of their litigation campaigns, and their teaching
and theorizing were central to the development of sex equality in the United
States. As one historian has commented, “the 1970s can be seen as a constitutional moment of enormous significance—a time of major change in
understandings of equality in the U.S. . . . . In those years women citizens
framed their demands for social equality as legal demands . . . .”99
The first article on gender issues appeared in the Law Review in the
1970–1971 volume—a student note about an Illinois case denying a husband’s claim for survivor benefits under the state workmen’s compensation
statute.100 The Illinois Supreme Court had upheld the discriminatory legislation because it gave preferential treatment to (rather than discriminating
against) women, but the student author predicted that Title VII would soon
be interpreted by the Supreme Court to find that such “protective” legislation was impermissible sex discrimination—which is exactly what happened.101 At this time, student-written articles were published without the
author’s name, so it is impossible to tell whether this note was by a male or
female student.
We do know that the second article on gender was written by a female
student, Elaine Bucklo, now a judge on the federal district court in Chicago.102 This comment, written before the first Supreme Court case to develop the constitutional standard on sex,103 advocates applying a strict
scrutiny standard to sex classifications, pointing out that this would obviate
the need for an Equal Rights Amendment by striking down sex discriminatory laws under the Fourteenth Amendment instead.104 The only legally
97

Linda K. Kerber, Writing Our Own Rare Books, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 429, 431 (2002).
See Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249, 250–51 (1998).
99
Kerber, supra note 97, at 448.
100
Comment, Workmen’s Compensation: Equal Protection and Protective Legislation for Women,
65 NW. U. L. REV. 1024 (1971).
101
Id. at 1026, 1029; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973) (striking rule
giving benefits to spouses of men but only to economically dependent spouses of women).
102
E-mail from Elaine E. Bucklo, District Judge, Northern District of Illinois, to Cynthia Bowman,
Professor of Law, Northwestern University (Mar. 21, 2005, 09:13:33 CST) (on file with authors).
103
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
104
Comment, Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 NW. U. L. REV. 481,
500–01 (1971).
98

45

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

significant differences between men and women, declared the author, are
physical strength and the ability to bear children.105 This comment, in short,
pointed to the manner in which the law did in fact develop in the litigation
campaigns of the 1970s, although the strict scrutiny standard was never attained.
The debate over the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”) dominated the
articles about gender issues in the Law Review during the 1970s. The campaign to pass the ERA, which would have made sex a suspect class under
the Constitution, spanned the decade, until the amendment expired for lack
of ratification by a sufficient number of states in 1982.106 Given the dearth
of women teaching in law schools at that time, it is not surprising that the
two articles about the ERA in the Law Review were written by male professors. The first, by Northwestern law professor Jordan Jay Hillman, analyzed the probable impact of the ERA on employment law, discussing areas
such as maternity leave, the employment of married women, fringe benefits,
protective legislation, and even sex-segregated bathrooms.107 His treatment
of these issues was very sympathetic to equal rights for women, but Hillman concluded that the EEOC Guidelines passed under Title VII were already sufficient to satisfy the ERA.108 Again, this was the direction the law
in fact took, as interpretation of Title VII by the courts largely obviated the
need for an ERA.
The second non-student-written article about gender was written by
Emeritus Professor Max Rheinstein of the University of Chicago Law
School. It addressed the effect the ERA would have on the law of marriage,
including surnames, residence, interspousal disputes, and the management
of marital property.109 Rheinstein pointed to German, French, and Scandinavian law as possible models for changing U.S. family law in the direction
of sex equality; he also wrote sympathetically about the need to protect
long-term housewives in the event of divorce, a theme that would become
important in feminist legal writing of the following decade.110
In 1972, Title IX, the Education Amendments, were added to the Civil
Rights Act, guaranteeing equal opportunity to men and women in public (or
publicly funded) educational institutions and ensuring that the number of
women in law schools would continue to increase. A 1978 student comment discussed whether a private right of action should be implied under
Title IX while the decisive case, Cannon v. University of Chicago, was
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pending certiorari in the Supreme Court.111 The student concluded, contrary
to the ultimate outcome of Cannon, that implication of a private right would
be inconsistent with the statutory scheme of enforcement.112
In the spring of 1973, a year after she graduated from Northwestern
University School of Law, Elaine Bucklo taught the first course on Women
and Law at her alma mater while working as a judicial clerk on the Seventh
Circuit.113 There were seven students in the class, all women.114 In 1974,
the course was taken over by Helen Hart Jones, an adjunct professor who
was an employment lawyer in Chicago, and was taught on an annual basis
to increasing numbers of students; in 1979, eight of the fifteen students in
the course were men.115 The course on Law and Women at Northwestern
was offered on a regular basis from 1973 until 1989, when it was replaced
by the current course on Feminist Jurisprudence, first taught by Cynthia
Bowman, one of the authors of this piece, who went on to co-author a casebook for West Publishing on the topic.116
The authors of the first generation of textbooks on women and law
were instrumental in changing the law. Ruth Bader Ginsburg directed the
Women’s Rights Project at the New York office of the ACLU, which instigated a litigation campaign modeled on the civil rights campaign of the
1950s and 1960s, seeking to invalidate sex discriminatory laws under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This campaign resulted in a series of major successes, striking down barriers to women’s entry into the professions and allowing them access to benefits in the public
sphere, but ultimately failed to achieve strict scrutiny of classifications
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based on gender.117 The litigation campaign also failed to establish pregnancy as sex discrimination under the Constitution, resulting in the famous,
and oft-ridiculed, footnote 20 in Geduldig v. Aiello, distinguishing between
“pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.”118 Some commentators attribute the subsequent flowering of feminist thinking about the law to these
failures.119 The 1970s had been dominated by liberal feminists and the goal
of formal legal equality—for women to be treated in the public sphere just
the same as men are. Women’s continuing inequality in the private sphere
(for example, their unequal responsibility for the care of children) and the
undeniable differences between men and women with respect to pregnancy
and childbirth demonstrated the limitations of formal equality thinking in
the law, calling for fresh approaches.
B. The 1980s: The Flourishing of Feminist Theory in the Law
The critique of the liberal feminist approach and of formal equality
thinking called forth a number of “schools” of feminist legal theory. The
first, and still very influential, theory to emerge was that of Catharine
MacKinnon, who published her seminal book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, in 1979. In her subsequent work MacKinnon developed her
critique of formal equality theory as based upon a male norm and proposed
an alternative, dominance theory, which focuses upon the structures of
power that make men’s characteristics (e.g., nonpregnancy) the norm.120
Another influential theory, often dated from the publication of Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice in 1982, emphasized the need to take account of
the differences between men and women and to value the “female” approach, which Gilligan described as based upon an ethic of care rather than
of rights. In feminist jurisprudence, this approach is often called relational
feminist theory.
The pages of the Law Review took some account of these developments in feminist legal theory during the 1980s, but for the most part did
not publish theoretical pieces. A 1980 student comment about the failure of
the Equal Pay Act to address female job segregation into low-paid jobs may
be seen as a critique of the formal equality approach. Its author, Melinda P.
Chandler, pointed to the systematic undervaluation of work done by
women, criticizing early Title VII case law in this respect, and argued that
the only solution to this problem was a theory of comparable worth, under
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which equal pay would be required not for identical jobs but for those requiring equivalent skills.121
The only piece of original feminist legal theory published in the Law
Review during this decade was Deborah Rhode’s influential article, Association and Assimilation, in 1986.122 A chapter in her larger book on gender
discrimination, the article addressed sex-segregated institutions such as single-sex clubs and schools, showing how they have both empowered and excluded women historically. Rhode emphasized the need for a contextual
analysis, distinguishing situations where sex differences translate into social
disadvantage and recommending an approach under which institutions that
perpetuate disadvantage on the basis of sex might be prohibited, while others might be maintained.123 Thus, unlike the approach of formal equality
thinkers, under Rhode’s approach, associations of disadvantaged or subordinated groups might be treated differently from associations of those in
power who are attempting to exclude those disadvantaged groups.
Deborah Rhode’s article is the only foray the Law Review made into
the world of feminist legal theory in the 1980s. Major theoretical developments in legal thinking about women were taking place during this decade,
but these developments were noted in the Law Review only in a series of
book review essays. A lengthy and reflective book review essay about
MacKinnon’s second book, Feminism Unmodified, written by another
prominent feminist legal scholar, Lucinda M. Finley, appeared in the Law
Review in 1988.124 A book review essay by Marie Ashe about Mary Ann
Glendon’s Abortion and Divorce in Western Law appeared in the same issue.125 (Indeed, Glendon’s book first took shape as the 1986 Rosenthal lectures at the Northwestern University School of Law.) It was not until 1993
that relational feminism found its way into these pages in an article criticizing its implications for the debate over abortion and arguing that “masculinist” theories based on autonomy, not relation, were necessary to defend
women’s rights in this respect.126
The feminist issue that dominated the pages of the Law Review in the
1980s was abortion, yielding a total of five major articles, three of them by
men. The first two, by Northwestern Professor Robert W. Bennett and by
Yale Law Professor Thomas I. Emerson, were directly related to the au121
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thors’ active participation in the controversy over abortion. Bennett’s 1981
article drew upon his (losing) argument to the Supreme Court in favor of
funding abortions under Medicaid.127 Professor Emerson’s article was derived from his own testimony to Congress against the then-pending Human
Life Amendment, which would have overturned Roe v. Wade by finding
that human life began at conception.128 In addition, in a 1989 article about a
Canadian abortion decision, Professor Glendon argued, as she had in Abortion and Divorce in Western Law, against the American model of grounding
abortion in a theory of individual rights and establishing it through courts
rather than the legislature.129
One of the articles about abortion in the Law Review did constitute a
major contribution to feminist literature about reproduction, however, and
reflected the explosion of theoretical writing on this issue in books, law reviews, and amicus briefs during the 1980s. Andrew Koppelman’s article,
Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, joined the
search for an alternative constitutional provision on which to ground the
right to abortion, alternative to the privacy-based approach in Roe v.
Wade.130 Privacy, of course, is a double-edged sword for women, shielding
as it had a great deal of violence against women from public view and legal
remedy. Koppelman, who joined the Northwestern Law School faculty in
1997, suggested grounding the right to abortion in the Thirteenth Amendment instead, arguing that compelling a woman to carry and to bear a child
constituted involuntary servitude. Koppelman’s article is the Law Review’s
only example of the creative thinking characteristic of feminist legal theory
on reproductive issues during this decade.
C. The 1990s: Gender Theory Established in the Academy
By the 1990s, gender theory was well established in law schools. Almost every school had a course on women and law—or feminist jurisprudence, as many of the more theoretical courses were now styled. The Law
Review, as legal literature all over, was full of articles on feminist theory
and on legal problems unique to women. Ten major articles on these topics
appeared during this decade, and women’s legal problems had become a favored topic for student notes and comments as well. Not one but two symposia on feminist topics were published in the Law Review. The first
annual Feminist Symposium was held in 1993; prominent feminist legal
127
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theorists were invited to speak, and the proceedings appeared in the 1993
issue in their entirety.131 Another symposium, on the topic of child sex
abuse, was organized by Michelle Landis, then-Articles Editor at the Law
Review and now a law professor at Stanford, and published as an entire issue in 1998.132
At least one major article on a feminist topic was published in every
volume of the Law Review during the 1990s. A number of generalizations
can be made about these articles. First, the vast majority—nine out of ten—
were written by women, reflecting their entry in more substantial numbers
into the legal academy. Does this make a difference to the topics and their
treatment? A review of the articles written by men over the period from
1992 to 2004 seems to indicate that it does. Their topics included: a legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment concluding that sex was never
intended to be covered by it, an article about disparate impact claims by
white males, therapeutic fetal surgery (ultimately coming out against it but
rather sympathetic to the rights of the fetus), and a critique of the reasonable
woman standard.133 Even though the authors by and large reached conclusions that are consistent with sex equality, these topics are very dissimilar
from those chosen by the female authors.
Apart from one theoretical (and not tremendously persuasive) article
attempting to locate MacKinnon’s dominance theory within the liberal tradition,134 the women law professors publishing in the Law Review in the
1990s chose to focus their attention on practical issues that have engaged
the reform efforts of feminist legal activists since the 1970s. As mentioned
above, one product of Second Wave feminism was a flurry of activity
aimed at reforming the law in the areas of rape, child sex abuse, domestic
violence, sexual harassment, equal educational opportunity, abortion, and
other reproductive issues. As the activists sought social change, their practice informed theory, which then informed practice.
This practice-theory-practice spiral can be easily illustrated by the development of the law concerning sexual harassment in the workplace.
MacKinnon’s 1979 book on the subject was derived in part from the at131
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tempts of women litigators (herself included) to create a cause of action for
the harms of sexual harassment; in it she analyzed those harms, discussed
how and why they were not cognized by current law, and proposed a new
way of conceptualizing sexual harassment as a violation of women’s civil
rights.135 Her analysis became the basis for the EEOC guidelines that laid
the foundation for modern sexual harassment law and were approved by the
Supreme Court in the Meritor case in 1986.136 By 1991, when the Clarence
Thomas confirmation hearings focused national attention upon the subject
of sexual harassment, more than a decade of feminist writing had developed
legal theory on the topic, which now reached the public as feminist law professors commented on sexual harassment law on television.137 After the
televised hearings, the number of complaints to the EEOC increased dramatically, and numerous open issues about the legal standard, employer liability, and application of the law to same-sex harassment were litigated—
and in turn analyzed in the law review literature, continuing the spiral.138
The women law professors writing in the Law Review during the last
fifteen years have participated in a similar theory-practice spiral. Susan
Stefan contributed a major article analyzing and criticizing Rape Trauma
Syndrome, an evidentiary concept coming out of first-generation rape reform and used in court to explain women’s counterintuitive reactions to
rape.139 Stefan argued that this characterization of women’s reactions to
violence pathologized them, making women reacting in a rational fashion to
violence appear to be crazy and in need of “adjustment,” thereby silencing a
more appropriate anger over a problem that was social and political, rather
than individual. At the same time, Stefan pointed out that silence over sexual abuse can indeed make women crazy, as evidenced by the statistics
about childhood sexual abuse among women in psychiatric institutions.140
This article is a wonderful example of second-generation feminist legal
thinking—it analyzes experience under the rape reform laws, points out
their shortcomings, and recommends changes in both the legal and mental
health systems as a result.
Domestic violence, another focus of the women’s movement in the last
decades, was the subject of three main articles and one student comment
over the five-year period from 1996 to 2001. Women authors discussed, in
light of feminist legal theory, the problems posed by spousal immunity
privileges in domestic violence prosecutions, the inadequacy of provisions
of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) to remedy the legal prob135
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lems of abused immigrant women, domestic violence as a ground for asylum, and the difficulty of implementing the interstate enforcement of orders
of protection under VAWA’s full faith and credit provision.141 All of these
are fine examples of engaged feminist legal scholarship. They are at the
same time good examples of scholarship in the line of traditional law review articles, which analyze the operation of the law in a particular area,
point to its shortcomings, and make recommendations for reform.
Women authors have also continued a major theme of feminist legal
theory and reform from the 1980s—one that is close to their personal experience: discrimination against women in law schools. In addition to publishing articles about bias against women in law school and in the law
school curriculum, women law professors in the 1980s had turned their attention to deconstructing the image of women in the casebooks from which
all lawyers are instructed.142 A 1993 article in the Law Review by Ann
Althouse is an excellent example of this scholarship. Choosing evidence
casebooks as her subject, Althouse’s extensive and detailed analysis shows
how women appear in evidence law courses as disturbed or vindictive liars,
and men as innocent victims, especially in discussions of rape shield statutes.143
Some of the most interesting recent work by feminist legal theorists is
in the field of family law. This is ironic in a sense, because articles on family law were the only ones arguably about women’s issues published in the
first half-century of the Law Review. In the 1970s, the impact of the formal
equality approach upon family law was, predictably, to erase ways in which
women were treated differently from men—to make alimony genderneutral, for example, and to do away with the presumption of maternal custody of children.144 The 1980s and 90s saw extensive criticism of these reforms by feminist legal scholars, who pointed out how they had harmed
women.145
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In 1996 and 1998, the Law Review published two major contributions
to this debate, both by the same author, Katharine B. Silbaugh. In the first,
Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, Silbaugh detailed the
economic value of housework performed by women without compensation,
and demonstrated its pervasive undervaluation by the law—in premarital
contracts, social security law, the law of consortium, tax law, upon divorce,
in the welfare system, and in labor law. Denying the productive nature of
housework, she argued, harms those who perform this work: women.146
Silbaugh’s second article built upon this analysis to reach the revisionist conclusion that marital contracts should not be enforced.147 This conclusion was directly opposed to the increasing trend by courts to uphold
contracts between married couples upon divorce, but only as to monetary
terms. In light of the fact that women’s nonmonetary contributions are
more significant than those of men, Silbaugh argued that monetary and
nonmonetary contributions should be treated alike, because the selective enforcement regime harmed women. Rather than concluding that both should
be enforced, however, she concluded that neither should be, because to enforce many nonmonetary provisions would harm the welfare of children
and lead to commodification of marital exchanges.148 These two articles are
immensely important contributions to the current—and lively—debate
about the nature of marriage. Like so much of the other writing by feminist
legal theorists during this decade, they deepen our understanding of the law,
of equality, of the nature of the public and private spheres, and of the differential relationship of men and women to the law.
D. Where Have We Been and Where Are We Now?
Feminist articles appear to have become less frequent in the Law Review during the first years of the new millennium. An article by one feminist legal scholar, Kimberly A. Yuracko, now a professor at the Law
School, has continued the tradition of blending doctrinal scholarship with
feminist theoretical analysis. In One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX’s
Sex-Based Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible?, she examined Title IX’s requirement that schools provide
varsity athletic opportunities to male and female students in proportion to
their numbers in the undergraduate population.149 After surveying a number
of value-neutral justifications for the proportionality requirement, Yuracko
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concluded that none of them can justify it. Instead, she concluded, the proportionality requirement is derived from a value-based commitment to cultivate traits in women that are valued socially.150
The majority of articles on feminist topics in the recent issues of the
Law Review, however, have been written by student authors. The connection between legal analysis and legal reform described above has been particularly appealing to women law students, who have written case notes and
comments on feminist topics in large numbers. Their topics are those that
have provoked feminist legal activism—for example, liability standards in
school sexual harassment cases under Title IX, single-sex education and
constitutional equality law, domestic violence and asylum law, and abuse
against mail-order brides as a form of sex trafficking or involuntary servitude.151 Some of these authors had taken the course in Feminist Jurisprudence and studied from the casebooks developed by first-generation
feminist legal scholars.
The student pieces also demonstrate how the reevaluation and promotion of student articles in the Law Review has contributed to the lively debate taking place in its pages. In the early years of the Review, student
authors wrote (and probably were assigned to) case notes on recent Illinois
Supreme Court cases; the work was predictably lifeless and dull, and it was
not attributed to them by name. Today, however, students pursue subjects
that interest them personally; many of those topics have to do with gender
and with issues that touch them in some way (the author of the piece on
mail-order brides, for example, was Filipina). Not only has the Law Review
become much more interesting as a result, but legal research has been profoundly enriched by this change.
Legal writing about gender has not all been about heterosexual women.
The 1980s and 1990s saw the growth of interest in legal topics affecting
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transsexual persons as well as theorizing about
gender from a queer perspective. The first courses on sexuality and gay
rights were taught during the 1980s, and the first casebooks on the subject
appeared in the 1990s.152 Except for a seminar taught once or twice by an
adjunct professor, however, courses on sexuality and the law have not been
available at Northwestern’s law school, although the topic is included to
some extent in Feminist Jurisprudence.
150
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The Law Review, through the efforts of its student authors, published
an article in this area even before literature on gay rights was at all common. A 1986 student case note dealt with the treatment of transsexuals under Title VII, criticizing the Seventh Circuit for failing to find that a postoperative male transsexual was legally a female for purposes of employment law.153 It was twelve years before another article in the area of gay
rights law appeared, a 1998 case note about gay-bashing in a public
school.154 The student lauded the Seventh Circuit for holding a school district liable for discrimination against a gay student, finding that he had
stated a claim for sex discrimination.
By the year 2000, feminist jurisprudence was a field with many competing theories—formal equality, dominance theory, relational feminism,
critical race feminism, queer theory, and postmodern feminism. The most
recent comment published in this field by a Northwestern student author
combines the last two of these theories, rather an unusual feat for a student.
Megan Bell’s 2004 comment on Transsexuals and the Law is an interdisciplinary piece that uses Foucauldian analysis of the legal system and social
control, along with postmodern feminist analysis by authors such as Judith
Butler, to criticize the outcome in a case involving the validity of the marriage of a transsexual for purposes of a Wrongful Death Act.155 The author
goes on to discuss the variety of legal contexts in which gender definition
may determine important rights, such as employment law, marital dissolution, and the like. The article clearly demonstrates how much more interesting legal doctrine and law reviews have become now that the academy has
discovered, like historians of the West, that all these diverse people have
been there all along.
III. THE OVERLOOKED FRONTIER: CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM
Although the Law Review’s articles on civil rights law, feminist jurisprudence, and sexual orientation acknowledged the presence of diverse
peoples and issues that concerned them, the Law Review virtually ignored
legal theorizing based on the perspectives of people of color. It is one thing
to use traditional or even feminist approaches to analyze legal issues affecting communities of color, but quite another to fundamentally integrate racial inequality and resistance into legal analysis. As Berkeley law professor
Angela Harris observed about legal scholarship two decades ago, “there
was, seemingly, no language in which to embark on a race-based, system-
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atic critique of legal reasoning and legal institutions themselves.”156 Since
then, a movement created primarily by minority law professors has provided the missing language to challenge the legitimacy of law by exposing
its complicity in the preservation of white supremacy and racial subordination.
In the late 1970s, scholars of color began to contest the colorblind
stance and victorious tone of the liberal approach that dominated civil rights
discourse. A decade later they had founded a branch of legal scholarship
called critical race theory (“CRT”) that put racism at the center of United
States law and policy and defined it as a systemic practice rather than a bad
attitude. Among critical race scholars were feminists who revised mainstream feminist theorizing to reveal the inextricable connection between racism and patriarchy in the lives of women of color as well as in legal
institutions that support hierarchies of power. Today, CRT is an established, though controversial, discipline: several books collecting the
movement’s key articles as well as a critical race casebook have been published,157 critical race scholars have written hundreds of books and articles,
and courses on these topics are taught at leading law schools across the
country. Their influence now extends beyond the law school walls to a variety of disciplines in universities across the globe.158 The renowned Princeton theologian Cornel West calls CRT “the most exciting development in
contemporary legal studies.”159
Yet the Law Review, as well as the Northwestern University School of
Law’s curriculum, has paid little attention to this important theoretical perspective. With the exception of one article, the few pieces addressing critical race theory and critical race feminism published in the Law Review have
been book reviews. To the Law Review’s credit, most of these publications
were authored by one of the leading figures in the CRT movement, Richard
Delgado, and deserve special attention. A discussion of Delgado’s contribution to the Law Review gives a glimpse of the exciting frontier of critical
scholarship on race that the Law Review failed to explore.
A. Critical Race Theory
Two prominent articles by then-Harvard law professor Derrick Bell
served as a bridge between traditional civil rights scholarship and critical
156
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race theory. Part of Bell’s 1976 Yale Law Journal article, Serving Two
Masters: Integration Ideals and Serving Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, adopted the traditional mode of civil rights scholarship
centered on the doctrinal analysis of race-related court decisions and conventional interpretation of civil rights statutes.160 Bell examined the Supreme Court’s approach to the practice of soliciting clients in civil rights
cases.161 But Bell went further to critique this traditional analysis by examining the dilemma of civil rights lawyers who attempted simultaneously to
serve their ideological purposes and the conflicting educational interests of
their clients which were no longer furthered by integration ideals.162 Bell’s
audacious challenge to the dominant integration strategy, focused on the actual interests of Black people, set the stage for CRT, both conceptually and
chronologically.
Four years later, Bell published another pivotal article, Brown v. Board
of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma,163 which introduced a
second, more devastating blow to the liberal understanding of civil rights
progress. Bell’s concept of “interest convergence” asserted that whites
were willing to support gains for Blacks when and only when these gains
also benefited whites. In other words, racial progress occurred strictly in
line with whites’ self-interest. Bell illustrated his point with the most heralded of civil rights victories, the Brown decision. He claimed that the Supreme Court issued its guarded desegregation mandate only because it gave
whites an advantage in the Cold War battle with communists for the Third
World’s allegiance.164 Moreover, Bell argued that whites had historically
sacrificed Black people’s interests to maintain white supremacy and would
continue to do so. These realizations led Bell to become a “racial realist,”
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See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Serving Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
161
Id. at 495–97.
162
Id. at 504.
163
Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). Professor Bell’s Yale Law Journal and Harvard Law Review articles are
often credited as formative works of critical race theory, even before the existence of a formal scholarly
movement. See, e.g., CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xx. Other intellectual precursors to CRT
include Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978), and Richard Delgado, The
Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984).
Derrick Bell also authored the first law school casebook on race. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE,
RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (1st ed. 1973).
164
Bell’s thesis has been confirmed by Mary Dudziak’s extensive archival research on the ties between federal support for desegregation and U.S. Cold War interests. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD
WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
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recognizing that racial progress in America would always be slow, sporadic, and incomplete.165
Bell’s pathbreaking articles ushered an outpouring of writing by scholars of color that confronted the failure of conservative, liberal, feminist, and
critical legal studies approaches to address the law’s central role in racial
subordination. In the summer of 1989, thirty-five legal scholars gathered at
a convent outside Madison, Wisconsin, to participate in the first workshop
on critical race theory.166 They shared their ideas for addressing the inadequacy of prevailing legal theory to grasp the more subtle and systemic
forms of racism that persisted despite the gains of the civil rights movement.167 Building on critical legal studies, radical feminism, nationalism,
and other critical theories, these scholars incorporated their own experiences and understandings of racism into the legal canon.
Rather than treating racism as an aberration that contradicts American
ideals, CRT holds that racism is systematically embedded in United States
institutions and culture and is commonly experienced by people of color.168
As Derrick Bell so powerfully argued, whites have a huge material and psychological stake in discounting racism in order to hold on to the privileges
they reap from it.169 CRT therefore rejects colorblind solutions to racial
inequality, recognizing that only aggressive, race-conscious remedies can
reverse the centuries-old institutionalization of white privilege and nonwhite disadvantage.170
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Bell elaborated the concepts of interest convergence and racial realism in a number of articles
and books. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992); DERRICK A.
BELL, JR., AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987).
166
See CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xxvii; Harris, supra note 156, at xix. Kimberlé
Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas provide the historical background and intellectual genealogy of the first CRT workshop. See CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xix–xxvii. For
a helpful primer on CRT, discussing its history, basic tenets, and distinctive themes, see DELGADO &
STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 156.
167
See CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xiv–xvi (discussing CRT’s “deep dissatisfaction with
traditional civil rights discourse”); Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theory of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990) (criticizing critical legal studies for its “myopic preoccupation with the limited role of theoretical deconstruction” and discussing
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s theology as model of reconstructive vision); Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331 (1988) (critiquing both neoconservative and critical legal studies approaches to civil rights
and advocating a “distinctly progressive outlook that focuses on the needs of the African American
community” and “is informed by the actual conditions of black people”).
168
See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 156, at 7; Crenshaw, supra
note 167.
169
See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
170
See CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xxix–xxx; see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF
THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of “Our Constitution is Colorblind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
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Critical race scholars have also contested the very notion of race. They
contend that races are not natural, biological classes of people, but socially—and legally—constructed divisions that have been used to legitimate
domination by one so-called race over others. In his book White by Law:
The Legal Construction of Race, for example, Berkeley professor Ian F.
Haney Lopez demonstrates how legal definitions of whiteness changed over
time in support of prevailing power arrangements.171 The dominant society
has deployed stereotypes and policies to racialize minority groups at different points in history in response to labor market needs and political developments.172 Although most of the early CRT writings concerned African
Americans, some CRT scholars have critiqued the “black-white binary” for
its simplistic focus on discrimination against African Americans,173 and
CRT has grown to encompass studies of diverse groups.174 LatCrit theory,
for example, emerged as a branch of CRT to investigate issues of particular
concern to Latinos, such as immigration, language rights, bilingual schooling, and identities based on multiple statuses and heritages.175
Critical race scholarship departs from conventional legal analysis in
methodology as well as theory. Its authors reject the dominant method of
applying supposedly neutral legal principles to arrive at answers, preferring
to seek out the perspectives and experiences of the most disadvantaged victims of racism.176 In keeping with their attention to voices from “the bottom,” critical race theorists incorporated multidisciplinary research, such as
historical and sociological studies, before it became trendy and frequently
171

IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); see also
DAVID ROEDIGER, WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS: HOW AMERICA’S NEW IMMIGRANTS BECAME
WHITE (2005); NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995).
172
See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 156, at 8.
173
See id. at 67–74; Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1213 (1997). But see Mari Matsuda, Beyond, and Not Beyond Black and White: Deconstruction Has a
Politics, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 393 (Francisco Valdez et
al. eds., 2002) (cautioning that deconstructing the black-white paradigm may hinder the struggle for racial justice).
174
Key CRT writings about Latinos, Asian Americans and Native Americans include: ROBERT S.
CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW AND THE NATION STATE (1999); IMMIGRANTS OUT!:
THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN AMERICA (Juan Perea ed., 1997); IAN F.
HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2003); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS,
THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); ERIC
K. YAMAMOTO, RETHINKING ALLIANCES: AGENCY, RESPONSIBILITY AND INTERRACIAL JUSTICE
(1999).
175
See Symposium, LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law, 85 CAL L. REV. 1087 (1997). Progressive
white scholars have also contributed significantly to CRT, especially on the topic of white privilege and
the failure of most whites to see it. See, e.g., BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE: WHITE
RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW (1998); STEPHANIE WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED:
HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996).
176
An early and important defense of “looking to the bottom” as a methodology is Mari Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323
(1987).
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use narrative, or “legal storytelling,” to support their arguments.177 In addition, CRT is as much a movement as a mode of analysis in that many of its
adherents are activists who are dedicated to ending the unjust racial order
that they study.178 Critical race scholars share “an ethical commitment to
human liberation.”179 Thus, they eschew the pretense of neutrality both in
legal doctrine and in their intellectual pursuits.
Many CRT professors have applied their critical praxis to the classroom by examining the role of teachers of color in academia and exploring
new pedagogies that train students to think more critically about law and
racial power.180 As CRT scholarship flourished, courses on CRT became
regularly available to students at about twenty law schools across the country, including the University of Michigan, Georgetown, and the University
of Iowa.181 UCLA School of Law offers a concentration in Critical Race
Studies, recognizing that “[t]o understand the deep interconnections between race and law, and particularly the ways in which race and law are
mutually constitutive, is an extraordinary intellectual challenge with substantial practical implications.”182 While students at Northwestern have
been introduced to CRT scholarship in courses on Race Relations Law,
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See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 156, at 37–49; Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989). A classic example of legal storytelling is Columbia law professor
Patricia Williams’s interweaving of personal stories and legal analysis in her 1991 book, Alchemy of
Race and Rights. For a debate about critical race scholars’ use of narrative and storytelling, see DANIEL
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN
LAW (1997); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 665 (1993).
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See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER
(1994). Among his many acts of activism, Derrick Bell resigned his tenured position at Harvard Law
School in protest against the school’s failure to hire an African American woman to its tenure-track faculty. He currently teaches at New York University. (In 1998, Lani Guinier became the first and only
woman of color among Harvard Law School’s tenured faculty.)
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CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xiii (noting that CRT scholars share a common desire “not
merely to understand the vexed bond between law and racial power but to change it”); see also
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 156, at 3 (stating that CRT “sets out not only to ascertain how society organizes itself along racial lines and hierarchies, but to transform it for the better”).
180
See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. (1989); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal
Scholarship and Teaching: Finding Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231
(1992); Margaret Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Legal
Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263 (2000).
181
See Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215, 1216
(2002).
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See UCLA School of Law Concentration in Critical Race Studies, http://www.law.ucla.edu/
home/index.asp?page=1084 (last visited Sept. 18, 2005).
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Law and Social Change, and a Constitutional Law Colloquium, the law
school’s curriculum has never included a course devoted to CRT.183
The Law Review also largely overlooked CRT scholarship. Its pages
contain only one article written from a CRT perspective. Richard
Delgado’s Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, an important contribution to the debate about the constitutionality of
hate speech regulation, was published in 1991.184 In 1998 and 2005, the
Law Review also published book reviews by Delgado.185 In addition, a 1998
essay by University of Chicago Law Professor Tracey Meares reviewed
Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty,
by Dorothy Roberts, a critical race scholar and one of this piece’s authors.186
Finally, Christopher Bracey’s review of The Anatomy of Racial Inequality
by Glenn Loury embraced CRT’s rejection of colorblindness and admonition that race-conscious remedies are needed to dismantle systemic racial
disadvantage.187
The conspicuous inclusion of Richard Delgado’s work in the Law Review bears special consideration. A professor and Derrick Bell fellow at
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Delgado is a giant in the CRT
movement and one of the nation’s most prolific legal scholars. His 1984 article, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, provided a crucial intellectual underpinning of CRT.188 The article
proceeds from Delgado’s discovery at the outset of his teaching career that
all of the twenty leading law review articles on civil rights were written by
white males.189 Delgado identified a scholarly tradition consisting of “white
scholars’ systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority scholars
183

As a visiting associate professor, Christopher Bracey, now a professor at Washington University
in St. Louis, taught a race relations course that included discussions of CRT, as well as other theoretical
approaches, but focused primarily on legal history. E-mail from Christopher Bracey, Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, to Dorothy Roberts, Professor of Law, Northwestern
University (July 11, 2005, 14:57:42 CST) (on file with authors).
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See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW.
U. L. REV. 343 (1991).
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See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo and Revisionism: Relearning Lessons of History, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 805 (2005) (reviewing IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR
JUSTICE (2003)) [hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo and Revisionism]; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 215
(1998) (reviewing STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE:
ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1997), and CHARLES MURRAY, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A LIBERTARIAN: A
PERSONAL INTERPRETATION (1997)) [hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap].
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See Tracey L. Meares, The Increasing Significance of Genes: Reproducing Race, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 1046 (1998) (reviewing DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION,
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997)).
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See Bracey, supra note 76.
188
See Delgado, supra note 163.
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Id. at 561. Delgado updated his research a decade later in Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outside Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349
(1992).
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from, the central areas of civil rights scholarship.”190 And he concluded that
this exclusion mattered: white scholars promoted a view of racism as isolated, aberrational, and outmoded acts that could be remedied without disturbing whites’ privileged position.191 The Imperial Scholar issued a
powerful condemnation of mainstream civil rights scholarship that highlighted the need for minority perspectives to gain greater prominence in law
reviews. Ironically, Delgado stands out as an exception to the Law Review’s failure to heed his admonition that student editors should pay more
attention to minority scholarship on racial issues.
Delgado went on to author or co-author more than one hundred books,
law review articles, book reviews, and essays that have contributed significantly to every key theme of CRT.192 His 1991 Northwestern University
Law Review article Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision was an early example of CRT intervention in the battle over the
constitutionality of state and university regulations of hate speech.193 In response to arguments that racial epithets and insults are protected by the
First Amendment, CRT writers described the concrete harms caused by assaultive speech and developed original theoretical defenses for protecting
its victims.194
In Campus Antiracism Rules, Delgado cast the constitutionality of
campus codes that punish racist speech as a choice between protecting
equality or protecting speech.195 Delgado pointed out that both approaches
were plausible and could not be balanced against each other; rather, prevailing constitutional analyses of hate speech regulation produced an indeterminate answer because they provided no way to prefer one paradigm over
the other. After discussing the competing speech and equality paradigms
and reviewing other nations’ failure to resolve the dilemma, Delgado offered a novel solution based on a “post-modern insight.”196 Delgado argued
that racist speech is distinctively harmful because it “constructs” a shared,
stigmatized image of minorities that helps to perpetuate racial subordination
by strengthening racist ideology and disempowering minority groups.197
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Id. at 576.
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See, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 156; DELGADO &
STEFANCIC, CRT: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 157; RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC,
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See Delgado, supra note 184.
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Id. at 383.
197
Id. at 383–86.
191

63

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

In a 1992 Yale Law Journal article, Rodrigo’s Chronicle, Delgado introduced Rodrigo, the fictional son of an African-American serviceman and
Italian mother, who returns to the United States from Italy, where he was
educated, to pursue an LL.M. degree.198 The brilliant Rodrigo’s intense discussions with an unnamed professor of color about burning racial issues
have become the ingredients for dozens of law review articles and a book
nominated for a Pulitzer Prize.199 Delgado’s two book reviews published in
the Law Review are part of this literature featuring Rodrigo and the professor.
Rodrigo’s Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley? critiqued the law-and-economics approach to
civil rights law by examining two 1997 books that opposed affirmative action and antidiscrimination laws, respectively—Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom’s America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible and Charles
Murray’s What It Means to Be a Libertarian: A Personal Interpretation.200
The essay is set in a hotel restaurant where the professor retires during a
break from an academic conference and encounters Rodrigo, now a law
professor himself, and Rodrigo’s politically conservative colleague, Lazlo
(“Laz”) Kowalski. As the three professors spar over the free market’s capacity to cure racism, Delgado weaves together a compelling four-part argument for race-conscious remedies.201 Using cultural texts and social
science data, Delgado shows that the human impulse to suppress others is
ubiquitous; other species use similar strategies to exclude competitors; people often irrationally refuse to help or trade with those of another race; and
highly formal settings elicit the least racism.202 “Racism does present a
unique challenge to free market philosophy,” Laz concedes.203
In Rodrigo and Revisionism: Relearning the Lessons of History,
Delgado addresses a topic that has preoccupied much of his recent writing—Latino civil rights. Delgado is one of the chief critics of the blackwhite binary paradigm that focuses on discrimination against African
Americans and that uses their struggle for civil rights as the model for other
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See Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap, supra note 185.
201
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ethnic groups.204 Delgado has helped to illuminate the particular history of
anti-Latino oppression205 and to make a case for expanding civil rights discourse and struggle to include Latinos on their own terms.206
Rodrigo and Revisionism reviews Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight
for Justice, published in 2003 by another leading CRT scholar, Ian F.
Haney Lopez.207 The essay opens with a nod to CRT’s social constructionist view of race as Rodrigo explains to the professor his newly discovered
Latino identity. Although Rodrigo previously emphasized his African
roots, he has decided to acknowledge more his mother’s Latin origins and
the Spanish-language heritage he acquired from his father, Lorenzo, who
grew up in the Dominican Republic.208 Through the dialogue between Rodrigo and the professor, Delgado praises Racism on Trial for its contribution
to the legal literature about the history of Chicano mistreatment and protest,
but laments that Haney Lopez and the 1960s activists he describes missed
an opportunity to further contest the black-white paradigm by distinguishing between the Chicano and African-American liberation struggles.209
Delgado suggests conquest and internal colonization of Chicanos in the
Southwest, in contrast to slavery, as the defining historical event in Chicano
history and the distinctive source of Chicano political disenfranchisement.210
Conquest and the subsequent racialization of Latinos, Delgado argues, requires particular remedies that need not be patterned after the Black civil
rights model.211
B. Critical Race Feminism
One of the most revolutionary branches of both critical race theory and
feminist theory is critical race feminism. Critical race feminists have highlighted the failure of mainstream civil rights and feminist paradigms alike to
see the intersection of racism and sexism in hierarchies of power and in the
experiences of women of color.212 Like traditional legal doctrines, these ap204

See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997); supra note 185 and sources cited
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See id. at 807.
209
See id. at 823.
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See id. at 824–26.
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See id. at 827–32.
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e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays and Feminist Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 103 (1994); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and
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proaches also “permitted women of color to fall through the cracks.”213 The
racial critique of feminism’s focus on gender as the primary locus of oppression has inspired an ongoing reconstruction of a feminist jurisprudence
that includes the historical, economic, and social diversity of women’s
lives. Critical race feminists have not only criticized feminist thought; they
have transformed it.
In an influential 1989 article, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex, published in 1989 in University of Chicago Legal Forum, Columbia and UCLA Professor Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” to denote the various ways in which race and gender
interact to shape Black women’s experiences of subordination.214
Crenshaw’s 1991 Stanford Law Review article, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, expanded this analysis in the context of domestic violence and rape.215 Both
articles demonstrated how dominant civil rights discourse focused on male
interests and feminism based on the experiences of white women erased
Black women altogether and forced them to choose between identities.
Angela Harris’s Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory confronted the shortcomings of dominant feminist jurisprudence more directly.216 Harris demonstrated that white feminist scholars were guilty of
“essentialism” by highlighting sexism as the most significant form of oppression in women’s lives and by implying that “there is a monolithic
‘women’s experience’ that can be described independently of other facets of
experience like race, class, and sexual orientation.”217 Feminist essentialism
made white women the norm and led to the fragmentation of nonwhite
women’s identities. Like Crenshaw, Harris concluded that under the prevailing feminist approach “black women will never be anything more than a
crossroads between two kinds of domination, or at the bottom of a hierarchy

Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997); Francisco Valdes,
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” Gender,” and “Sexual
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of oppression; we will always be required to choose pieces of ourselves to
present as wholeness.”218
Critical race feminists, including Asian, Latina, and Native American
scholars, have dramatically altered feminist legal theorizing by placing at its
center women’s multiplicity of identities and forms of oppression and resistance.219 They have examined a broad range of legal concerns particular to
women of color that previously remained invisible in existing legal approaches.220 Critical race feminists have also examined the particular histories of oppression various groups of women experienced, along with the
disparaging, racialized images of minority women’s sexuality and motherhood that legitimize their subordination.221 And they have studied nonwhite
women’s resistance against oppression, which has often differed from white
women’s struggles, and advocated incorporating their visions of liberation
in feminist and antiracist initiatives.222
Finally, critical race feminists have highlighted the unique battles of
minority women to gain entry and respect in the legal academy and profession.223 Veteran Northwestern University law professor Joyce Hughes, the
first African American woman to gain tenure at a predominantly white law
school, made important contributions to this literature.224 These battles were
especially visible when the vilification of two Black law professors became
the focus of national attention. In 1991, when University of Oklahoma law
professor Anita Hill, now at Brandeis, revealed that U.S. Supreme Court
nominee Clarence Thomas had sexually harassed her, the ensuing media
campaign to impugn her character revived stereotypes of Black female li218
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centiousness, deceit, and disloyalty to the Black community.225 As University of Iowa law professor Adrien Katherine Wing observes, “there was no
national precedent for dealing with or understanding the worldview of a
Black female law scholar and teacher.”226 Two years later, University of
Pennsylvania law professor Lani Guinier, now at Harvard, was subjected to
similar disparagement when President Bill Clinton nominated her to head
the U.S. Justice Department Civil Rights Division. Alluding to the derogatory myth of the “Welfare Queen,” the conservative media labeled Guinier a
“Quota Queen” while distorting her writings on affirmative action.227
Professor Wing attributes her motivation to create the first collection of
critical race feminist writings to these disturbing events involving Black
female law professors. In 1997, she published Critical Race Feminism: A
Reader, now in its second edition.228 Wing’s Global Critical Race Feminism: An International Reader expanded on the issues covered in the prior
work to include international and comparative law, global feminism, and
postcolonial theory.229 Another important anthology, dealing with Black
men’s relationship to the feminist project, is Black Men on Race, Gender,
and Sexuality: A Critical Reader, edited by UCLA professor Devon Carbado.230
The Law Review’s sole account of critical race feminism was the publication of a 1998 essay by Tracey Meares reviewing Killing the Black
Body: Race Reproduction and the Meaning of Liberty by Dorothy Roberts.231 Killing the Black Body recounts the history of regulation of Black
women’s reproductive lives and exposes a resurgence of policies that devalue Black motherhood, including the disproportionate prosecution of
Black women for using drugs while pregnant, state-sponsored programs to
encourage use of risky, long-term contraceptives by Black teenagers, and
welfare reforms designed to deter women receiving public assistance from
having children. Noting that mainstream theories of reproductive rights ig-
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nored these violations, Roberts argued that “the meaning of reproductive
liberty must take into account its relationship to racial oppression.”232
Killing the Black Body belongs to the struggle by feminists of color to
transform the meaning of reproductive freedom in America. Women of
color have long advocated a more complicated understanding of reproductive rights that extends beyond legalized abortion to encompass a broad
right to reproductive control, including the right to bear children.233 They
have placed reproductive rights in a social context that made government
provision of family planning contingent on improvements in general health
and living conditions. An emerging literature on the history of the reproductive rights movement not only includes the long-neglected activism by
women of color but highlights its pivotal position in the movement.234
Professor Meares commends Killing the Black Body for its critical
analysis of the racial politics surrounding reproductive health policy that
“excavates” easy assumptions and reveals new ways of understanding these
policies.235 “It is impossible to read this book without thinking critically
about what Roberts has said—and possibly changing your thinking as a result of the enterprise,” Meares writes.236 Meares faults the book, however,
for failing to uncover the heterogeneity of Black public opinion and Black
politics on these issues.237 She suggests that greater attention to class inequities is necessary to implement Roberts’s vision of reproductive liberty, in
part because such attention will render the vision “more politically acceptable.”238
CONCLUSION
In 1926, the Law Review’s main discussion of race relations law appeared in a Northwestern law professor’s article that supported racial zoning by private contract because “the fear of a negro invasion materially
interferes with the profitable sale of almost every homesite.”239 For the
most part, the Law Review’s first half-century of publication simply ignored
women and people of color as well as the important questions of race and
gender that were swirling in the world around it. In the next fifty years,
however, the Law Review took account of the flourishing of legal theorizing
on race and gender that reflected the entry of minorities and women into the
232
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legal academy and responded to activists’ efforts to use the law for social
change. The recognition of race and gender as important themes in the law
has produced more complex, interesting, and useful legal theories that no
doubt would shock the sensibilities of the white men who dominated the
Law Review’s early pages.
The Law Review’s discovery of race and gender was incomplete, however. Acknowledging the presence of people of color is important, but it
leaves too pretty a narrative of race and other forms of social injustice in the
United States and the law’s central complicity in maintaining them. Like
the period when Lewis and Clark “discovered” the American West, the past
one hundred years constituted “a barbaric century for the legal academy,
which has, wittingly or not, [provided] the justificatory framework for
shameful social practices that continue to this day.”240 In the last two decades, critical race theorists have produced a radical body of scholarship that
highlights the failure of traditional civil rights and mainstream feminist approaches to see the law’s central role in “shameful social practices” involving race. Their analyses of systemic racism and visions for achieving social
justice vitally changed existing legal paradigms. “Critical Race Theory is a
gasp of emancipatory hope that law can serve liberation rather than domination,” writes Cornel West.241 The failure to fully explore this important
frontier of legal thought significantly limited the Law Review’s discovery of
the field of race and gender.
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